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Over the past decade, infrastructure issues intermittently have
moved toward the forefront of the domestic policy agenda. The coming
year promises to intensify debate. By September 1991, Congress must
re-authorize the federal highway program. Unlike past re-authoriza-
tions, this time Congress almost certainly will have to set new priorities
and incorporate new principles of cost sharing for highways, since the
original mission of the federal highway program will have been accom-
plished. Sometime in 1991-92, workers will complete the last segments
of the interstate highway network, bringing to an end an era of
road-building that began with Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 and has
dominated infrastructure spending since that time. Any consensus that
Congress reaches regarding the definition of a new federal role in the
highway program, or the appropriate use of price incentives in grant
programs, is likely to spill over to the financing of other infrastructure
functions.
This paper sets out to provide an introductory perspective on the
current infrastructure policy debate. It begins by considering the record
of public capital spending. Most of the studies claiming extreme erosion
of infrastructure investment start their story with the 1960s, which
turned out to have been the peak period for infrastructure spending. A
somewhat longer perspective better captures the wave pattern that has
characterized infrastructure investment, but the impression of a secular
decline in gross investment is weakened. In this perspective, the late
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1970s and early 1980s still stand out as a period when the net public
capital stock (after depreciation) almost ceased to grow.
It is one thing to demonstrate that capital spending has declined. It
is another to prove it is also too low. Is public capital undersupplied?
Recent approaches to this question have emphasized the role of infra-
structure as an intermediate good contributing to private production. In
a series of studies, Aschauer has argued that public capital enters
strongly into the private sector’s production function, raising the pro-
ductivity of both private capital and labor. His findings imply rates of
return to infrastructure investment as high as 50 to 60 percent. Insofar as
these returns vastly exceed those available to private investment, they
imply that, yes, public infrastructure capital is undersupplied.
Infrastructure also yields final consumption services for house-
holds. In many states, households still vote directly on the bond issues
used to finance capital projects, or on the tax and fee revenues raised to
recover initial investment costs. As a result, direct evidence is often
available regarding household demand for infrastructure spending. The
evidence of undersupply, using consumer willingness to pay as ex-
pressed in bond referenda, is almost as strong as the evidence derived
from production function studies. Over the past six years, 80 percent by
value of all state and local infrastructure bond proposals have passed.
The average margin of voter approval exceeded 66 percent, a substan-
tially higher approval rate than found in any other kind of expenditure
referendum. These results imply that, at least in recent years, taxpayer-
consumers have been willing to buy more infrastructure capital than
was actually provided by public authorities.
This paradox merits more attention than it has received. How can
one account for the apparent undersupply of infrastructure? Aschauer’s
results imply that private producers can benefit more in terms of private
output from a dollar of public investment than they can from a dollar of
their own investment in private plant and equipment. Since the costs of
public investment are shared with households, it would seem that, out
of self-interest, business groups should be lobbying violently for tax
hikes to finance an expanded public capital budget; and, if this fails,
they should volunteer to pay the costs of additional public capital
investment entirely on their own. Furthermore, the recent rates of voter
approval of infrastructure projects at referendum imply that, with even
modest leadership from the business community, it should be possible
to stitch together a politically persuasive constituency for greater infra-
structure spending. Either the empirical results are exaggerated, or the
political system has failed to undertake high-payoff investments that
also have broad political support.
The possibility that recent studies have overstated infrastructure
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ers various explanations that could account for undersupply in the face
of genuine demand. The argument offered is that political leaders have
overreacted to what might be called the "fear of rejection at referen-
dum." Since the taxpayer revolt of the 1970s, the very act of referendum
voting--and the possibility it brings of public repudiation--appears to
intimidate officials. Rather than designing capital proposals that satisfy
the median voter, they seem to aim higher (or with more risk aversion)
to win support from as large a majority of the electorate as possible in
order to minimize the chance of rejection. This tendency has been
exacerbated in some states by formal changes in the taws, which now
require super-majority approval for capital financing issues. Infrastruc-
ture spending at the state and local level has become misaligned with
taxpayer-voter preferences, in part because officials are reluctant to put
forward capital proposals that .go as far as the majority of voters want.
The paper concludes by considering how this political bottleneck on
infrastructure spending can be broken. Traditional decision-making
mechanisms are badly equipped to handle joint consumer and producer
demand for publicly provided goods. Referenda and other voting
proxies incorporate the principle of "one man, one vote." No device is
available for weighting votes by willingness to pay or by economic stake
in the outcome. Business, for its part, is accustomed to expressing its
expenditure demands largely through lobbying. As a result, a good deal
of political ingenuity in recent years has gone into inventing institutions
that can legally invest in infrastructure without submitting to the
referendum process. This strategy seems to be a mistake. The most
striking cases of turnaround in state or local infrastructure spending
have occurred precisely where new business-consumer alliances have
taken their case to the public and asked for voter support. Typically,
these proposals have included a redesigned tax or fee package that has
targeted a greater share of costs to business and users, thereby relieving
the cost burden on the general taxpayer who must approve the new
spending.
Trends in Public Capital Investment and Capital Stock
The first warnings of an impending infrastructure crisis were issued
more than a decade ago by authors who called attention to the sharp
decline in public capital investment. This decline has been measured in
several ways. For example, the National Council on Public Works
Improvement (1988) reported a drop in public works capital outlays by
all levels of government from 2.5 percent of GNP in 1963 to about 1.2
percent of GNP in 1978 and 1.0 percent in 1984. Growth in the public116 George E. Peterson
capital stock, net of depreciation, fell to less than 1 percent per annum
between the late 1970s and mid 1980s.
It is true that maintenance and operations costs associated with
infrastructure facilities rose substantially over the same period. This
makes interpretation of the capital spending data alone somewhat
problematic. As large capital programs, such as the construction of the
interstate highway system, are completed and the first generation of
facilities built under the program matures, it is natural that the infra-
structure spending mix should shift toward maintenance. Indeed, until
legislative modifications in federal highway financing were made in
1982, one of the principal criticisms of federal highway aid was that it
was inefficiently directed almost exclusively to new construction. Now,
some 40 percent of federal highway funding goes for repairs and
rehabilitation of existing roads and bridges.
More active maintenance throws into question some of the assump-
tions about depreciation that are built into estimates of the public capital
stock. In principle, depreciation rates should be treated as endogenous.
Better maintenance and repair can stretch the useful life of infrastructure
facilities, and even keep them in as "good as new" condition for a
significant period.1 The assumption, used by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and others in estimating capital stocks by the perpetual
inventory method, is that depreciation schedules are fixed exogenously
and not affected by maintenance practice. This assumption may exag-
gerate the rate of slowdown in capital stock accumulation that occurs
when, as recently, public works spending shifts toward maintenance
away from capital construction.
Figure 1 places gross investment in three of the core infrastructure
functions in somewhat longer perspective. It shows that the 1968-71
level of capital spending for highways was the product of a decade’s
climb in gross capital investment. From a longer perspective, the decline
in gross investment may seem to be more a cyclical receding from the
initial impetus of the highway program than a secular trend. As Tart
(1984) has pointed out, broad cyclical swings have long characterized
infrastructure investment in the United States, as one wave of building
programs subsides and another begins to rise.
Figure 1 also illustrates the central role of federal legislation and
federal aid in initiating the major waves of public capital formation.
Critical legislative dates are highlighted in the figure. In 1956 Congress
passed the federal highway program. In 1982 it boosted the federal gas
~ In their examination o~ capital spending in 433 New Jersey communities, Holtz-
Eakin and Rosen (1989) find that they cannot reject (at the 5 percent level) the hypothesis
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tax to augment the highway trust fund. Both measures triggered strong
growth in highway investment; ironically, the two pieces of legislation
were adopted, twenty-six years apartj at almost the same level of real
state and local gross investment in roads and highways. Wastewater
investment began its upward swing shortly after passage of the 1972
Water Pollution Control Act, which first incorporated grants for munic-
ipal treatment facilities.
International comparisons also extend the frame of reference for
capital spending. A comparison of net public investment as a share of
gross domestic product in the Group-of-Seven countries, for example,
seems to show investment trends for several European countries com-
parable to those in the United States (Figure 2).2
In fact, interpretation of these trends points to some important
definitional issues that underlie current discussions. "Infrastructure"
spending has been equated with public nonmilitary investment and, in
the United States, with state and local investment. Many infrastructure
functions, however, can be provided by either the public or the private
2 See Reidenbach (1986) and Jackson (1988) for further detail of infrastructure issues in
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sector. In fact, in response to budgetary pressures on government, a
tendency has developed to shift previously public capital responsibilities
into private hands. The most widely publicized privatization efforts are
those that involve complete and sudden breaks with public supply--for
example, the building of private toll roads or the United Kingdom’s sale
of regional water authorities to the private sector.
The precipitous decline in government infrastructure spending in
the United Kingdom during the 1970s, however, stems in part from
another kind of privatization. During this time government changed
from a significant land developer and investor in land improvements to
a net seller of improved land. The growth in the net sales of improved
land, which enter into OECD’s national income accounts as negative
capital formation by government, alone accounts for more than one-half
of the real decline in general government capital investment between
the years 1975 and 1982. This substantially distorts any cross-national
estimates attempting to relate productivity decline to measured decline
in public capital formation.
Another example of the impact of public-private classification on
the recorded growth of infrastructure capital occurs in Sweden. At first
glance, Sweden appears to be an interesting exception to the pattern of
decline in the growth rate of public capital stock-~especially in theIS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE UNDERSUPPLIED? 119
transportation and communication sector. However, closer examination
shows that total sectoral capital growth has been the product of two
strikingly different trends (Sundberg and Carlen 1989). Telecommuni-
cations investment has been rising rapidly, while highway investment
has been falling. The fact that in Sweden both are public responsibilities
masks a shift in investment pattern that in other nations would reveal
itself as a relative decline in the public capital stock. As privatization
initiatives accelerate, it would seem important to begin measuring
infrastructure capital in functional terms, summed across the public and
private sectors, as well as according to ownership or source of financing.
Government-produced infrastructure may be of special interest because
of the way expenditure and financing decisions are made. If, largely for
historical reasons, infrastructure networks serving fast-growing sectors
of the economy have been assigned to the private sector while networks
serving manufacturing and slower-growth sectors are in public hands,
the shift toward lesser intensity of public capital in production may
reflect not a failure of government supply but an orderly change in factor
usage that would occur regardless of public or private provision.
Is Public Infrastructure Undersupplied?
The mere fact that infrastructure investment has suffered a steep or
persistent decline does not mean that the country should invest more in
public capital. In considering whether public infrastructure is undersup-
plied or oversupplied, analysts have pursued two quite different lines of
study, reflecting the joint nature of infrastructure services. Public capital
simultaneously provides inputs into private production and yields direct
services to final consumers. When infrastructure is viewed as part of the
private-sector production function, the desirability of further investment
can be judged by the rate of return it generates in terms of private
output. If the return to infrastructure investment exceeds that available
from other investment opportunities, the public capital stock ought to be
expanded.
How the optimal level of public capital for final consumption should
be decided is perhaps less clear. Many infrastructure needs studies
imply that public officials should first make an expert judgment regard-
ing the quality of infrastructure services that is appropriate for the
citizenry, as well as the condition of the underlying capital, and then
find ways to pay for this desired level of output and maintenance.
In many states, however, voters have substantial opportunity to
vote directly on infrastructure programs and their financing. Under a
taxpayer-voter model of state and local government, public officials
ought to supply the level of final infrastructure services that consumers120 George E. Peterson
are willing to pay for, either as expressed directly through their votes in
bond and other referenda or indirectly in general elections.
Recent literature has devoted its principal attention to the payoff in
private sector production from investment in public capital stock. This
line of analysis was initiated by Aschauer (1988a, 1988b, 1989a, 1989b)
and extended by Munnell (1990), among others. It represents public
infrastructure---especially core infrastructure--as entering directly into
private production functions. Therefore, increases in the public capital
stock produce increases in private output, and increases in public capital
usage relative to other factors of production increase the productivity of
both private capital and labor.
The empirical findings have been striking. In his original studies,
Aschauer reports results that imply rates of return to public investment
as high as 50 to 60 percent per annum. The decline in the growth of the
public capital stock since the 1960s is found to explain by far the largest
part of the slowdown in private sector productivity growth over the
same period. In some of the studies, a dollar of public investment yields
more private output gain than does a dollar of direct, private invest-
ment. These results are so strong that skepticism has been expressed as
to whether they simply reflect coincident trends in infrastructure invest-
ment and productivity growth since the 1960s rather than a causal
linkage.3 Taken at face value, however, the findings imply that public
infrastructure capital is presently greatly undersupplied, even if infra-
structure facilities have no value in providing final services to consumers.
Taxpayer-Voter Demand
Whether infrastructure capital is undersupplied from the point of
view of the taxpayer-voter has received less analytical attention. A
partial answer to this question can be obtained from a closer look at
voters’ revealed preferences as expressed in bond elections and other
referenda. The measure is admittedly imperfect, because only part of
state and local infrastructure spending passes through the referendum
process. (In 1988, $26 billion of new bond proposals for capital invest-
3 For example, see Schultze (1990) and Hulten (1990). The risk of attributing too much
significance to parallel trends can also be seen in international comparisons. As noted in
the text, the steep decline in net infrastructure investment recorded in the United
Kingdom (Figure 2) is to an important degree an accounting artifact created by government
changeover from being a land developer to a net seller of developed land. Given
Aschauer’s cross-country analysis of productivity change (1989b), the disposition of
government assets in the United Kingdom would by itself have been sufficient to depress
the U.K. productivity growth rate by 1.2 percentage points. The coincidence of this
(reported) slowdown in public capital formation with productivity decline also is likely to
produce overestimates of the productivity impact of infrastructure capital.IS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE UNDERSUPPLIED? 121
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ment, excluding refinancing, were submitted to voters, of which
$21 billion were approved. This compares with total state and local
gross investment in 1987-88 of $104 billion.) However, referendum
results may be taken as a general proxy for citizens’ broader spending
preferences.
If states and localities with referenda procedures truly tried to
satisfy the median voter, they would submit frequent bond proposals
for voter consideration in order to assess voter demand. Bond approval
rates and margins Of passage should hover near 50 percent. That is, if
local officials attempt to design capital programs that match the median
voter’s preference, bond elections should be closely contested. High
majorities voting "yes" in bond elections imply that even after a new
project is built, infrastructure still will be undersupplied, relative to
simple majority preferences.
The relation between bond referendum approval rates and desired
spending is illustrated in Figure 3 under the assumption of a normal
distribution of voter preferences. The percentage of voters in favor of an
infrastructure bond proposal will be the cumulative percentage who
desire at least this much investment spending (shown as the shaded
area in the diagram). A high rate of voter approval implies that many
voters who would vote against an infrastructure proposal that just122 George E. Peterson
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matched median-voter demand nonetheless support the actual pro-
posal, because it involves a lower level of investment.
The record of infrastructure bond referenda voting suggests that,
since at least 1984, voters have been willing to support higher levels of
public infrastructure investment (Figure 4). Between 1984 and 1989, on
a value basis 80 percent of infrastructure bond proposals were approved
at public ballot.4 Even this figure understates the extent of public
support, because the lowest approval rates were registered in states that
require more-than-majority margins for bond approval. The margins by
which spending proposals have passed have also been high. Since 1984,
the average infrastructure bond proposition submitted to referendum
has commanded more than 66 percent voter approval---a rate of support
exceeding that recorded for any other type of referendum.
Voter support for infrastructure initiatives has not been a perma-
nent feature of the fiscal landscape. During the early 1970s in particular,
bond approval rates occasionally reached as low as 30 percent as public
exasperation with state and local expenditure growth manifested itself
4 Infrastructure bonds are defined to include the following functions: roads and
highways; water and sewer; public buildings (including jails and general government
facilities); and education. Education is the largest single category.IS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE UNDERSUPPLIED? 123
as opposition to all classes of public spending, including infrastructure
financing.
Besides the broad cyclical swings in voter support visible in Figure
4, annual voting outcomes have a strong sawtooth pattern. The low
points in voter approval come in odd-numbered years--the years
without general elections, when voter turnout is much lower. The most
ardent voters have been those opposed to new tax and spending
proposals. General voters, who tend to vote on referendum proposi-
tions only during general elections, have been far more likely to vote in
favor of new infrastructure projects,s The annual fluctuation in voting
outcomes was most marked during the 1970s and early 1980s, when a
core group of tax opponents regularly voted against and defeated bond
and tax proposals during "off" years. Over the past few years, the
passionate division of the electorate into opponents of spending and
others seems.to have subsided.
All in all, the record of taxpayer voting suggests a history of clearly
expressed preferences that correlates well with actual state and local
investment patterns. Bond rejection rates surged for the first time in
1968. That date also marks the high-water mark in state and local
infrastructure investment, and the beginning of a long period of
slowdown in public capital formation. Voter approval now has recov-
ered and stabilized. The reasons for taxpayers’ change of heart are not
completely clear, but they seem to combine diminished opposition to
government spending in general with special support for infrastructure
proposals. Years of low state and local investment, coupled with more
evidence on the consequences of cutbacks, appear to have convinced the
electorate that, at the margin at least, it is now appropriate to increase
infrastructure commitments.
Explaining the Undersupply of Infrastructure Capital
Arguments that affirm an undersupply of public infrastructure
require a political explanation. With two powerful constituencies de-
manding more public investment--a business community that perhaps
can gain as much from government-financed infrastructure investment
as from its own capital spending, and an electorate that appears
disposed to approve higher levels of public capital outlays--what
political mechanisms could frustrate these demands? Why should public
capital remain undersupplied?
s This is consistent with the survey findings of Gramlich, Rubinfeld, and Swift (1982),
who found that nonvoters generally opposed tax limits and were more likely to support
public spending than those who voted.124 George E. Peterson
Benefit Spillovers
One class of explanations for undersupply emphasizes the spillover
benefits inherent in some types of infrastructure systems. As long as
some of the benefits from public capital facilities spill over to users
outside the local taxing district, local taxpayer-voters, looking only at
their own benefit-cost trade-off, will choose to provide a suboptimal
level of infrastructure capital.
Spillover benefits are dealt with most efficiently by the pricing
system. A universal user charge system, in which all users, regardless of
place of residence, pay a fee that covers the marginal costs they impose
on a network, will automatically balance demand and supply. (An
additional fixed subsidy may be necessary for networks that show
declining marginal costs.) Where user fees are impractical, the same
result can be approximated through intergovernmental matching
grants. A higher level of government compensates the local jurisdiction
for the share of system costs imposed by nonresidents. Faced with a
lower tax price, local voters will demand the optimal level of infrastruc-
ture provision.
The system of matching grants used in the United States, however,
has capped allocations. The matching provisions do not apply at the
margin where expenditure decisions are made.6 Under these circum-
stances, state or local governments will still undersupply infrastructure
that generates spillover benefits.
The practical importance of the spillover argument to infrastructure
supply decisions is unclear. Spillover benefits certainly are present in
some networks, such as road systems used by out-of-state drivers. They
are likely to be particularly important in the networks used by business,
where greater national market orientation is to be found. The spillover
argument therefore may help to explain why the business sector has not
asserted more leadership in demanding higher levels of local infrastruc-
ture investment. Local firms are able to use capital networks paid for by
other jurisdictions for part of their business; conversely, any infrastruc-
ture that local business helps pay for through local taxes will be used in
part by outsiders who do not have to pay.
6 Seen from a local perspective, the "capping" of categorical matching grants may be
exaggerated. Few of the federal grant programs operate by simply matching local
spending up to a fixed amount. Many involve discretionary determinations of which local
projects will be eligible for federal matching. Thus, the federal highway program has
included discretionary bridge projects. Other highway funds and Environmental Protec-
tion Agency grants for municipal wastewater treatment have had fixed allocations at the
state level, but competition by state criteria for individual project eligibility. Local
jurisdictions thus face the possibility of stretching or shrinking federal matching dollars
based on the projects they propose.IS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE UNDERSUPPLIED? 125
The spillover share of use for almost all infrastructure systems,
however, is well under 50 percent. Even after discounting the reported
aggregate private returns to exclude the share attributable to externali-
ties, and therefore not captured locally, recent estimates of the private
sector payoff to infrastructure investment imply that the local return
should be enough to generate strong business support for infrastructure
investment financed through local general taxes. Thus, the paradox
remains. Why has business not been more active, and more successful,
in demanding increased state and local capital outlays?
Spillovers, of course, do not help account for the paradox of
apparently unmet infrastructure demand from household voters. Voting
in bond elections reflects the pricing rules and grant system currently in
use. A reform of user charges or the grant structure, so as to shift more
of the incremental capital costs to outsiders, might well induce local
voters in the future to support still higher levels of infrastructure
spending, but current voting already takes into account any caps on
federal or state grant aid.
Voting Requirements
When public officials are asked to identify the principal constraint
on expanding infrastructure investment, their answer is the need to
submit bond or tax proposals to the electorate for voting.7 The tax revolt
of the 1970s and early 1980s has left a strong residue of apprehension.
Out of fear of rejection, officials have been reluctant even to propose
expenditure and tax increases for voter consideration.
The intimidation effect can be seen by comparing Figures 4 and 5. In
the early part of the period, bond approval rates were very high, and
public officials appeared to ratchet upward capital spending proposals in
response to these high rates of voter approval. By 1968, the volume of
bond proposals submitted to the public in referendum exploded to $40
billion. However, that year also brought a steep decline in voter
approval rates, which continued to fall in 1969 and in off-year elections
thereafter.
In response, public officials began to back away from infrastructure
bond proposals. The dollar volume of bond initiatives fell sharply
(Figure 5). This process was accelerated by the imposition of new state
tax and spending limitations, some of which required super-majority
7 For example, in a survey conducted by the National League of Cities, 35.9 percent
of all cities stated that the major obstacle to increased local infrastructure spending was the
need to secure voter approval at referendum, a larger percentage of respondents than
identified any other obstadeo Among cities that actually are required to seek voter
approval, this was overwhelmingly cited as the principal obstacle.126 George E. Peterson
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votes to override tax or borrowing ceilings. Only recently, after years of
strong voter support for infrastructure proposals, has the volume of
spending initiatives submitted to the electorate by state and local
officials begun to rise again.
The potentially distorting effects of agenda setting on the referen-
dum process have been pointed out by others (for example, Romer and
Rosenthal 1978). A commonly expressed fear has been that local officials
can manipulate expenditure outcomes upward by proposing excessive
spending levels, to which the only alternative may seem continuation of
the status quo or reversion to a lower level of spending if the proposal
is defeated. The data presented here suggest a more realistic fear is that
risk-averse local officials will be intimidated by the voting process
into proposing less infrastructure spending than voters are willing to
support.
A special case where local voting requirements clearly have im-
posed inefficiency and underspending on capital expenditure decisions
occurs in states that have imposed super-majority voting rules for bond
or tax approval. Local governments in California, Massachusetts, Mis-
souri, Washington and other states have had to secure two-thirds or
other extraordinary margins of voter approval to pass bond initiatives or
tax overrides. Other states (for example, Michigan) have required voterIS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE UNDERSUPPLIED? 127
approval at referendum plus a super-majority legislative approval for
state bond initiatives. The requirement that more than a majority of
voters approve a new bond issue has been devastating to tax-supported
bond financing and infrastructure investment. California, for example,
has fallen from one of the leaders in per capita highway investment to
last or next to last in the nation, as the result of bond-voting and tax
restrictions,a
Public officials have sought to circumvent the limitations placed on
tax-supported infrastructure by creating special districts and special
authorities outside of the general government structure. These are
typically empowered to raise project revenues and issue bonds for
capital spending as long as they do not tap the general taxing authority.
Authorities that are exempted from state bond limitations, such as the
city redevelopment authorities in California, have had. to take on a broad
and otherwise inexplicable array of capital financing responsibilities.
We thus are presented with the curious juxtaposition of states and
localities failing to respond in full to voters’ apparent willingness to
increase capital spending, while continuing to search for complicated
institutional ways to avoid public referenda in the future; The picture
can be reconciled only by visualizing governments that distrust the
electorate, and therefore are reluctant to interpret their positive voting
signals too literally.
Failure to Take Advantage of the Joint Products of Infrastructure
As emphasized earlier, the typical infrastructure facility delivers
joint products--input services to private producers as well as final
services to household consumers. The combined demands of these two
groups should be able to sustain aggregate infrastructure demand that
exceeds the levels supported by either source on its own. Business and
consumer demands are not entirely separable, of course--households
presumably value the same congestion savings in the journey to work as
producers. Nonetheless, the areas of overlap are limited.
Unfortunately, the mechanisms normally used to express infra-
structure demand at the local or state level are ill-suited for aggregating
business and consumer preferences. Most referendum voting operates
under the principle of "one man, one vote." Unless the tax costs of a
s Econometric studies of state capital spending have found debt ceilings to have
significantly depressing effects on capital outlays (Bunch 1988; Burstein 1984). When these
studies are reformulated to identify states that must submit tax-supported bonds for voter
approval, either because of general constitutional provisions or because they are at a debt
ceiling that requires voter approval to override, the depressing effect on capital spending
is much stronger.128 George E. Peterson
project can be allocated so that cost shares are matched with willingness
to pay, voting results are likely to underrepresent efficient infrastructure
provision levels, since each voter’s opinion is counted equally rather
than being weighted by willingness to pay.9 As a result, business
demand is likely to be underrepresented in traditional referenda.
Business can be more effective in government through lobbying and
logrolling arrangements, but this demand too has proved difficult to
unite with the interests of final consumers. In states where ultimate
voter approval is required for most infrastructure financing, business
persuasion of the legislature in any event may be an insufficient
condition for realizing greater infrastructure investment.
The jurisdictions that have achieved the most dramatic turnarounds
in infrastructure investment are those that have managed to forge a
business-taxpayer alliance to take the case for infrastructure spending to
the public. Business typically has taken tl~e lead in organizing and
financing these alliances, and sometimes has accepted a mix of general
taxes and fees that falls more heavily on the business community, in
order to increase voter support. In effect, some of the producer surplus
generated by higher levels of infrastructure spending is spent on the
campaign to achieve that investment. For example, in Cleveland, Ohio,
the business community took the lead in demanding higher levels of
capital spending, in order that the region could restore its business cost
competitiveness. Business leaders organized the voter campaign in
support of an increase in the local income tax rate, once they were
assured that one-half of the increased revenues would be earmarked
exclusively for capital reinvestment and they were guaranteed a role in
identifying specific project priorities for future investment. The recent
campaign to increase California’s gas tax and dedicate the proceeds to
transportation investment was similarly a joint business-citizen effort
organized by business. The constitutional proposal, which increases
state capital spending on highways by an estimated $15.5 billion over
ten years, passed with 52 percent of the vote. If subject to the
super-majority voting standard of an ordinary local bond proposal, it
would have failed.
9 Some voting systems have attempted to weight votes in a way that approximates
willingness to pay. For example, it has been common in Texas and some other states to
weight votes in municipal utility districts by the number of individual lots the owner
possesses. That is, the decision whether to install utility networks is decided on a "one lot,
one vote" basis. A developer may control 1,000 lots or more and therefore have his
economic interest represented far more strongly in the referendums than an individual
owner. This system has been shown to lead to much higher demand for infrastructure
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Conclusions
In the end, the undersupply of public infrastructure is as much a
problem of political economy as pure economics. The view most
commonly expressed by public officials is that they know more public
investment is desirable, but their hands are tied by an electorate that
does not share their opinion and makes the final determination about
expenditure levels. The evidence reviewed here suggests that this
explanation for undersupply of infrastructure is spurious. If anything,
voters appear to be ahead of public officials in their willingness to
support the costs of increasing public capital investment. Nevertheless,
a great deal of political ingenuity during the past two decades has been
devoted to circumventing the need for voter approval of infrastructure
spending proposals. Over the long run, this effort is likely to be
counterproductive. Proponents of stronger infrastructure investment
seem to be better off taking their case directly to the public.
The debate over public capital’s role in private productivity so far
has been pitched at the national level, with the implication that if the
claims of linkage are borne out, the appropriate response would be
greater federal funding for infrastructure programs. Why this should be
so is not explained. Ordinary state and local spending systems should
be able to channel and accommodate any sustained increase in demand
for infrastructure. If spillover benefits are a significant deterrent to local
expenditure choice, the user fee and grant systems should be revamped
so that at the margin local price signals induce efficiency. Otherwise, the
major impediments to demand expression seem to be state and local
officials’ fear of the voting process and the uncertainty of the business
sector about how best to combine its demands with those of final
consumers. Public voting behavior with respect to infrastructure finance
has stabilized a great deal over the past decade. Voters appear willing to
support spending programs where cost-sharing arrangements have
been tailored to reduce the burden on the general taxpayer. Therefore,
it should ultimately be up to the business sector to resolve the current
debate over the productivity impact of public capital, by deciding
whether the infrastructure payoff justifies business shouldering a sig-
nificant part of new investment costs at the state and local levels.130 George E. Peterson
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According to a popular view that has found its way into many
newspapers and magazines, the sharp decline in the rate of spending on
public infrastructure capital since the 1960s has left the United States
with a serious shortfall of public capital. Awareness of this problem is
not new. I can remember a business conference in the early 1980s at
which Amitai Etzioni and I spoke. I was listening as Etzioni concluded
his remarks with some advice given only half in jest: "If you come to a
bridge on your way home, don’t cross it." At that time, the Mianus
River bridge was still standing.
Until recently, the evidence for a shortfall in public infrastructure
was mainly anecdote and opinion. Lately, however, Aschauer (1989)
and others have given this popular view more scholarly cachet by
adducing econometric evidence that (1) the marginal productivity of
public capital is extremely high compared to that of private capital and
(2) the falloff in public investment accounts for much of the productivity
slowdown in the United States.
All this has led many commentators, including me, to advocate
more public spending on infrastructure (Blinder 1988, 1989). About a
year ago, I testified at a Joint Economic Committee hearing on the
subject. Congressman Lee Hamilton asked four of us whether we would
favor an additional $15 billion in infrastructure spending, if that meant
increasing the federal budget deficit by $15 billion. I believe he was
surprised when three of the four said yes (U.S. Congress, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee 1989).
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In his interesting paper for this conference, George Peterson does
not really dispute this common view. He starts out as if he might by
bringing up several measurement issues. First, he points out that
highway spending spurted from 1950 to about 1968 and then declined
until about 1982. (See Peterson’s Figure 1.) Thus comparing the early
1980s (the cyclical trough) with the mid-1960s (the cyclical peak) exag-
gerates the decline. Second, he notes that most infrastructure can be
provided either publicly or privately. Since the mix of public versus
private infrastructure differs across countries, and on occasion changes
dramatically within a single country, international comparisons of levels
or trends are hazardous.
Peterson is correct on both counts. However, the second problem is
irrelevant to time series studies of U.S. infrastructure, since our public/
private mix has not changed. Regarding the first problem, Peterson’s
Figure I seems as exaggerated (in the opposite direction) as the numbers
he criticizes. After all, it is hardly germane to compare absolute levels of
spending in two years almost four decades apart. Peterson’s graph
shows that spending on highways was about two and one-half times
higher in 1988 than in 1950. But the U.S. population was 62 percent
larger and real GNP was three and one-third times as large. So highway
spending declined as a share of GNP, just as everyone has been saying.
Finally, I would have thought that the demand for public infrastructure
capital has an income elasticity greater than one. (Compare, for exam-
ple, the relative infrastructures of rich and poor countries.) If so, we
should expect infrastructure to grow faster than GNP. Plainly, it has not.
In the end, Peterson accepts the evidence for undersupply of
infrastructure. Two pieces of evidence persuade him.
The first is Aschauer’s finding that public capital has a very high
rate of return, perhaps as high as 50 to 60 percent. Here I would like to
underscore an important point that Peterson makes, but does not
emphasize. Many of the most important benefits from public infrastruc-
ture do not accrue to businesses and/or are not counted in the GNP. If
I spend less time waiting at airports, I am happier; but the improvement
in my well-being does not appear in GNP. If my car and my back absorb
fewer shocks from potholes, I am surely better off; but GNP may even
decline as a result of fewer car repairs and doctors’ bills. The only
benefits from public infrastructure that get into Aschauer’s calculations
are the ones that add to GNP. That these alone might account for a 50 to
60 percent return (or even half that much) is amazing to me.
Peterson’s second type of evidence is a creative idea--creative, at
least, to an economist. He points out that about 25 percent of infrastruc-
ture spending proposals are subject to direct approval or disapproval by
voters and that, lately, such referenda have passed about 80 percent of
the time--and by majorities averaging 66 percent. Such an overwhelm-DISCUSSION 133
ing record of voter approval amid a taxpayer revolt suggests that
Americans actually want more infrastructure than they are getting and
are willing to pay for it.
I agree and would enter just two qualifying remarks. First, if (1) the
median voter theory is correct, (2) politicians know voter preferences,
and (3) politicians fear losing at ~the polls (as Peterson says), then all
public bond issues should win approval. So an 80 percent victory record
is hardly amazing. What is surprising is the two-to-one average margin
of victory. It suggests either an extreme degree of risk aversion among
politicians, or that something is wrong with either (1) or (2) above. The
second remark is just a question for Peterson: Are the 25 percent of
infrastructure projects that are submitted to referenda a random sample
of the population? I simply do not know.
The most interesting parts of Peterson’s paper come next. If you
accept the case that infrastructure has been undersupplied, you come
face to face with a question: Why? Peterson mentions three possibilities
that I would like to discuss.
First, and foremost in his mind, is politicians’ fear of rejection by the
voters. I find this a plausible hypothesis, and not just because of the
evidence Peterson offers. Anyone who lived in tax-revolting America in
the 1980s must find it believable that politicians asked voters to tax
themselves only with great trepidation. After all, Ronald Reagan was
watching.
Peterson’s analysis contains an implicit political model that might
be missed: the number of bond proposals that politicians bring to the
voters is a function of approval rates in the recent past. A reasonable
idea. As a macroeconomist, however, I feel duty-bound to report that
this is not a rational expectations model unless lagged approval rates are
the best predictor of the current probability of approval. It may,
however, be a good model despite potentially "irrational" expectations.
How else, for example, can you explain the fact that the members of
Congress display so little political courage even though their reelection
rate approximates their body temperatures?
Of course, Peterson’s tacit model is more substantial than this.
Referendum approvals lead, with a distributed lag, to more construction
and hence to a higher infrastructure stock. And more infrastructure, in
turn, lowers the public’s appetite for still more, hence reducing approval
rates. If we put all of these pieces together formally, I suppose we would
end up with a cobweb model of infrastructure spending. Before we.
conclude that everything is nicely regulated, let me remind everyone
that cobwebs need not converge.
Peterson’s second explanation for undersupply is a more conven-
tional economic one: externalities. Since some of the benefits from an
infrastructure project accrue to people outside the jurisdiction that pays134 Alan S. Blinder
for it, underinvestment can be expected from a social point of view. I
agree again. Peterson suggests user fees as the right way to deal with
this problem, and I agree yet again. However, the problem is a bit
trickier than Peterson indicates when an infrastructure project has
public good aspects. In those cases, a free rider problem exists even
within the jurisdiction, and user fees may not do the job. In fact, in some
cases user fees can be positively harmful. For example, a toll booth can
make an uncongested bridge congested.1
Peterson’s third explanation is the only one with which I must take
exception. He argues that the political process systematically under-
weights the benefits that infrastructure gives to businesses (as opposed
to those it gives directly to consumers). I find this notion implausible on
two grounds.
First, it presupposes a very thick form of corporate veil~almost an
iron curtain. After all, each of us is both a consumer and a producer, and
nothing says that we voice--or vote--only our interests as consumers.
On the contrary, every stockholder, manager, and employee of every
corporation that can benefit from more infrastructure spending is
capable of making herself heard in our democracy. Many of them do. I
always thought it was the consumers who were the silent majority.
Second, as one who grew up under the American system of
government-by-lobbyist, I have a hard time believing that business
interests do not get a fair hearing in state legislatures. In fact, it seems to
me that business lobbyists are all too successful when it comes to
regulatory issues, antitrust enforcement, trade protection, special tax
favors, and the like. Why should I believe that these same interest
groups suddenly become impotent when it comes to voicing their
demands for infrastructure? In addition, we all know--or, rather, I
thought we all knew--that large companies often extort favors from state
and local governments by threatening to move their plants or offices to
another jurisdiction. Why is it that they cannot clamor for more roads,
bridges, and schools?
I think they can. In fact, I would like to advance a different
hypothesis: that business is not in fact pushing for more infrastructure
(and for the taxes that go with it) even though it might be in its own
interest to do so. That, some Chicago economist will object, would be
irrational. But Peterson can hardly raise that objection after assuming
irrational behavior by politicians and an iron corporate veil! More
seriously, I think we are entitled to see some evidence before we accept
Peterson’s hypothesis that, on this one issue, corporations are political
eunuchs. Are the potential users of infrastructure (not the road builders)
Once I waited in a long line to pay a five-cent toll on a bridge near Philadelphia!DISCUSSION 135
in fact lobbying hard for more spending, but failing? I’m from New
Jersey: show me.
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infrastructure spending during the past decade or so is largely cyclical
rather than reflective of a secular trend. After a period of stagnation, he
now sees demand for infrastructure increasing on the part of both the
public and business. For him the critical question is why public capital is
undersupplied, in the face of demand from two powerful constituen-
cies. As a historian, my interest is in examining his hypothesis about the
cyclical nature of infrastructure provision as well as exploring the
conditions in which upturns in infrastructure spending have occurred in
the past. My remarks are primarily intended as an historical addendum
to both Peterson’s paper and the focus of the conference as a whole.
The Cyclical Nature of Infrastructure Investment
An examination of the history of the infrastructure in nineteenth
and twentieth century America reveals a series of cycles or bursts of
spending followed by periods of retrenchment and stability, not neces-
sarily marked by any regularity. This characteristic relates to spending
for capital infrastructure by both the private and public sectors. Private
sector spending has been tied relatively closely to the general business
cycle (with some notable exceptions, such as electric traction construc-
tion in the 1890s and telephone sales in the 1930s), while public sector
expenditure is somewhat more complicated. The public sector has
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engaged in infrastructure formation in periods of rapid urbanization and
economic development, but it has also undertaken infrastructure con-
struction for countercyclical purposes. Federal government activity
during the New Deal is the most famous example of such countercyclical
spending, but both municipal and state governments also followed the
practice in the nineteenth century. In fact, for municipal governments
this pattern often created debt crises.
Infrastructure construction was marked not only by a cyclical
funding pattern but also by occasional shifts in the level of government
doing the spending. That is, while some infrastructure historically has
been provided by all levels of government--city, county, state and
federal~the role of major provider has often shifted from one govern-
mental level to another. The major impetus for change was an inability
to finance infrastructure spending because of constitutional limitations
resulting from previous overspending. These shifts also increased the
role of the private sector. A brief history of the major cycles of
nineteenth and twentieth century infrastructure spending illustrates this
generalization.
The concept of "the state" acting as a service provider rather than a
regulator of the economy was a relatively new one in the nineteenth
century. In the decades of the 1820s, ’30s, and ’40s, however, state
governments were especially active in providing capital for transporta-
tion infrastructure. These projects were either under state control or
were "mixed enterprises," combining public and private construction
and operation. State interest in these projects included promotional
goals, a desire for public profit, concern over the limitations of private
corporations, and the provision of employment. These state public
works projects reached a peak in the 1820s and ’30s, but spending
dropped sharply after the depressions of 1837 and 1857 due to over-
investment, high taxes, and corruption. In addition, state constitutional
restrictions on borrowing, passed after the depressions, forced many
states to follow a pay-as-you-go policy, which severely restricted new
projects.
Municipalities and counties, convinced that their economic futures
depended on access to transportation, often filled the infrastructure
investment gap. State legislatures passed hundreds of laws permitting
local aid grants for construction projects. During the middle of the
century, city governments increasingly assumed the function of service
providers, investing in streets, waterworks, and sewers, as well as other
infrastructure elements. Some of these projects, such as street improve-
ments, were financed by assessments on abutters or even general tax
revenues, but increasingly cities came to depend on borrowing to
finance infrastructure construction. As historian Eric Monkkonen notes,138 Joel A. Tarr
during the period after 1850, the "issuance of debt changed from a rare
expedient to the norm for cities" (1984, p. 129).
Cities invested heavily in infrastructure improvements in the years
from 1866 to 1873, and per capita municipal debt increased from $6.36 in
1860 to $13.38 in 1870, at a time when state debt only increased from
$8.17 to $9.15 (current dollars). A sharp economic downturn in the early
1870s, however, forced many municipalities to default on their obliga-
tions. State legislatures responded by establishing limitations on munic-
ipal debt based on a percentage of assessed valuation, inserting debt
limitations in city charters, and requiring devices such as sinking funds
and voter approval of bonds. By 1880, more than half the states had
constitutional limitations on city debt, usually a set proportion of the tax
base. In the 1890s, however, as urban population soared, state limita-
tions were eased and instruments to bypass them, such as public
authorities, were created. As a result, city borrowing for capital im-
provements resumed, continuing until World War I.
The 1920s witnessed a return to the earlier, nineteenth century
pattern of heavy state involvement in transportation improvements,
especially road construction and surfacing. The generative factor was
the automobile, which became widely available as production costs
dropped dramatically. The federal government also provided funds for
road construction on a matching basis. The most important innovation,
however, was the enactment of the gasoline tax, beginning with Oregon
in 1919. By 1929, all states had approved the tax, which became the
principal source of highway revenues. These user fees provided 60
percent of the funds for the increase in highway expenditures between
1913 and 1930.
In the 1930s, the federal government assumed its largest role in
infrastructure investment to that time. Various federal agencies, espe-
cially the Public Works Administration, provided between 60 and 65
percent of all public construction from 1933 to 1938. This unprecedented
intervention was aimed at four goals: relieving mass unemployment;
developing the use of public works as a yardstick by which to measure
the performance of private enterprise; "priming the pump"; and win-
ning political support for the Democratic party. Heavy federal involve-
ment in infrastructure spending continued during World War II, but
primarily for the war effort rather than civilian needs. In the decades
since the end of the war, federal involvement in infrastructure construc-
tion has gone through the familiar cycles of contraction, expansion, and
then contraction, with the largest spending devoted to the interstate
highway system, urban mass transit, and environmentally related
technologies such as sewage treatment facilities.
The history of infrastructure provision, therefore, shows a cyclical
pattern in terms of both levels of funding and governmental involve-DISCUSSION 139
ment, rather than any consistent trend. And, these cycles did not
necessarily follow any regular pattern. In addition, every period of
limitation was not necessarily followed immediately by great expansion
in investment, even though demand appeared to exist. Periods of large
public investment required a combination of factors, not all demand-
related. In short, the history does not necessarily guarantee that we are
on the eve of a new burst of spending for infrastructure.
Public and Private Provision of Infrastructure
Although it is widely believed that today’s movement towards
privatization represents the first major shift from public to private
supply of infrastructure, history provides many instances of shifts in
both directions. A good example is water supply. Well into the nine-
teenth century, householders either obtained their own water supplies
(from wells and cisterns) or relied upon private water companies.
Increasingly during the century, however, the inability or unwillingness
of private companies to meet the needs of growing cities to provide
water for fire protection, household uses, and industrial purposes
forced municipalities to assume this function. At the time of the Civil
War, about 42 per cent of the 136 waterworks in the nation were publicly
owned, including those of the nation’s sixteen largest cities. The trend
towards public ownership reversed during the decade after the depres-
sion of 1873 when municipal spending was capped, but resumed once
again by the 1890s. In 1914, about 70 per cent of the nation’s waterworks
were municipally owned and, by 1925, municipalities and public author-
ities owned about 82 percent of the nation’s waterworks, servicing
between 85 and 90 percent of the population. Data are sparse for the
intervening years, but by 1989, 58 percent of the nation’s 59,621 water
systems were privately owned, serving about 20 per cent of the
population. Private, investor-owned companies have increased in num-
ber and share of the population serviced, but most large city systems
remain publicly owned.
The provision of other elements of the infrastructure has also
shifted from the private to the public sector. Bridges, for instance, made
a transition from being largely privately owned (with tolls) in the
nineteenth century to largely public ownership in the twentieth. Mu-
nicipal transit was mainly private until World War II, although various
forms of public ownership or mixed public/private construction and
operation existed in some large cities such as New York. In the 1950s, as
private transit companies experienced heavy losses, many were ac-
quired by city governments and by public authorities created for that
purpose. With the creation of the Urban Mass Transportation Admin-140 Joel A. Tarr
istration in 1964, the federal government became a major player in the
provision of transit services. Other urban services, such as waste
collection, have over the past two centuries shifted back and forth
between private and public provision because of dissatisfaction with the
quality of service, a failure to fulfill contract provisions, and political
change. In contrast, citywide sewerage systems have been almost
entirely publicly constructed and operated from the time of their first
appearance in American cities in the 1850s.
Why Periods of Rapid Infrastructure Construction
Occur
One of Peterson’s major arguments is that although public demand
for infrastructure spending exists, the various anti-tax campaigns of the
1980s have made public officials excessively timid about advancing
infrastructure spending programs. McDonald and Ward (1984) have
recently suggested, however, that this type of behavior is the norm for
local public officials, not the exception. That is, because of restrictive
fiscal ideologies, vested bureaucratic interests, and failure to achieve
consensus on fiscal expansion, "local politicians" have usually been
"timid, seemingly inert, and always incremental" in regard to spending
(p. 32). One might ask, then, under what past conditions has rapid
infrastructure investment occurred?
An examination of past periods of rapid infrastructure formation,
such as the mid-1890s through 1914 and again 1921 to 1929, suggests a
combination of factors on the demand and supply sides. First, these
were periods of great city growth and therefore of increased city
building, which created a large demand for services in order to create a
more viable and operative environment. Some of these demands re-
quired infrastructure that would facilitate production, while others were
more oriented toward providing an infrastructure for consumption,
although the two have often overlapped. Since urban commercial elites
usually believed that infrastructure was linked to economic develop-
ment, they often supported public spending for infrastructure, espe-
cially for downtown improvements.
A second important factor in generating investment was the ap-
pearance and adoption of new technological innovations. New technol-
ogies have played critical roles in driving infrastructure cycles because
they often require additional infrastructure for their implementation and
lead to an expansion of urbanized areas that require other forms of
services. This process has been most identified with the automobile, but
it was also true of other transport technologies such as the steam
locomotive, the street railway, and the airplane. Some of these technol-DISCUSSION 141
ogies, such as the steam railroad or the automobile, increase mobility;
the automobile also provides flexible mobility. Yet, they often require
inflexible infrastructures, such as roads, highways, viaducts, railroad
stations, and garages, that can become barriers to change.
Large expenditures for infrastructure have often been undertaken
because policymakers believed that the technologies involved would
help solve major problems facing society. In the nineteenth century, for
instance, municipalities often invested in systems of piped-in water
because they had experienced disastrous epidemics and/or fires and
wanted to avoid them in the future. A further incentive for the adoption
of waterworks was the lower fire insurance rates that would result.
Investments in sewers resulted from the realization that they would
substantially reduce mortality and morbidity, as well as from a desire to
eliminate the nuisances created by overflowing cesspools and flooding.
In the early twentieth century, municipalities made large expenditures
for water treatment technologies because of a concerr~ over the disas-
trous health effects of drinking sewage-polluted water. The technology
itself evolved because of advances in bacterial science. Closer to our own
time, huge federal investments in sewage treatment technologies have
taken place since 1972 because of a concern over environmental deteri-
oration and the health effects resulting from pollution. Here a rise in
leisure time and leisure activities appears to have changed public values,
making voters willing to pay for environmental quality.
Conclusion
This brief history of infrastructure investment and construction
affirms the essential cyclical nature of investment patterns, the shifting
proportions of public and private ownership, and changes in the level of
government providing the service. It also suggests that bursts of
infrastructure spending do not necessarily result from concerns over
infrastructure deterioration and inadequacy of service. Rather, such
periods of rapid increase in investment occur because of a combination
of factors on the demand and supply sides. On the demand side,
population changes, especially rapid city growth, concern over social
problems susceptible to a technological solution, and political develop-
ments appear most important. On the supply side, capital availability
and technological innovation loom the largest.
The contrast between our own time and periods of rapid infrastruc-
ture investment in the past is informative because it highlights the
extent to which today’s conditions differ from past periods of expansion.
Those earlier periods were marked by major urbanization and critical
technological change, as well as by new funding mechanisms and142 Joel A. Tarr
sources of capital. While the United States has experienced the emer-
gence of a new urban form--the decentralized "outer" city--in the past
25 years, this new "city" has primarily generated extension and retro-
fitting of old technologies rather than technological innovations. The
major exceptions in regard to technology have been communications
advances. These developments, however, have essentially been in-
volved with increasing the efficiency of existing systems rather than
replacing them. Real interest rates are relatively high, and while some
new funding mechanisms have appeared, no major innovations, such as
creation of an infrastructure bank, have occurred. What the history
appears to say is that we are in a period unlike any past period of
infrastructure "growth" in regard to its configuration of social, political,
fiscal, and technological forces. This suggests that those interested in
expanding infrastructure investment should avoid strategies that empha-
size massive needs at enormous cost and should opt instead for a variety of
flexible approaches.
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